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I.   Introduction 
The U.S Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has mandated the nationwide elimination of 
the pesticide Azinphos-methyl, also known as AZM or Guthion, by September 30, 2012 (Federal 
Register 2009; EPA 2009).  AZM belongs to the organophosphate (OP) class of pesticides and 
since the late 1960s, it has been the most used pesticide by apple growers in Washington State 
(Brunner et al. 2007).  As of 2008, 80% of Washington apple growers used AZM (Washington 
State University 2010), primarily as a control for codling moth, the leading pest in Western apple 
orchards.  (See appendix table 1 for historical AZM usage in Washington.)   
The EPA’s mandate is the result of concerns about the risks of OPs to the health of farm 
workers and the quality of local water and aquatic ecosystems. Details about the toxicity of AZM 
and other supporting data that guided the agency’s decision are provided in the EPA’s Ecological 
Risk Assessment (EPA OPPT 2005) and Organophosphorus Cumulative Risk Assessment (EPA 
OPP 2006).   
  Because most growers are expected to shift to an AZM-alternative Integrated Pest 
Management (IPM) strategy rather than relying solely on non-chemical methods or quitting 
production (Brunner 2009), the EPA regulation challenges the apple industry to control the 
codling moth while transitioning to a combination of safer, AZM-alternative pesticides.
1  Though 
an AZM-alternative IPM program is more worker- and environmentally-friendly, it requires 
different timing and more precise spray applications than AZM.  Furthermore an additional spray 
of new pesticides is required to maintain yield and quality since the alternative pesticides do not 
                                                 
1 Integrated Pest Management is an encompassing phrase describing a combination of mating disruption, 
field monitoring for targeted pesticide use, and new pesticides to protect against pests.  It is endorsed by the 
Washington State University Tree Fruit Research & Extension Center (n.d.).   Many growers already use an OP-
based IPM program and need to switch to an OP-alternative IPM scheme (Brunner 2009). Details of various 
alternatives to AZM can be found in Brunner et al. (2007), but the most likely alternative includes (among others) 
the OP-alternative pesticides Altacor (chlorantraniliprole) and Delegate (spinetoram).    
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have as long-lasting residues (Brunner 2009).  Therefore the alternative codling moth treatment 
is more costly per acre than using AZM because both the unit price and the quantity needed 
increases.  
We estimate the economy-wide impact of eliminating AZM in favor of a new pest 
management alternative in apple production in Washington State.  In particular, we estimate the 
change in sales (value of activity produced), prices, and employment for Washington’s apple 
industry and for the Washington economy.  We study Washington because it accounts for 58% 
of U.S. apple production in 2007 (USDA NASS 2009) and 65–75% of the fresh market (Pollack 
and Perez 2005).  Furthermore, Washington is particularly vulnerable to the AZM ban because: 
(a) in 2007, AZM was used on 66% of Washington’s apple bearing acres (USDA NASS 2008) 
and (b) apples are the leading agricultural commodity in Washington, with sales accounting for 
more than 70% of the market value of Washington’s $2+ billion fruit industry (USDA NASS 
2009).   
We use a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model to estimate the impacts of the 
AZM ban on Washington’s apple industry and other upstream and downstream economic sectors 
within the state.  We estimate the increase in the per acre expenditure of switching to a non-AZM 
pesticide scheme that ensures the same volume and quality of apples produced as before.  We 
consider the apple industry’s response to this cost increase by allowing growers to change the 
amount of the various inputs (such as labor or pesticides) into production thus resulting in a 
change to output.  The economic effects we study are changes to sales, prices, and employment 
for the apple industry, industries that supply inputs to the apple industry, industries using apples 
as an input, household income, and profit per acre of Washington apples.  Unlike other 
methodologies, CGE analysis accounts for inter-sector relationships and price changes.   
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We estimate that the ban has a relatively modest negative impact on the Washington State 
economy.  We find a change in apple sales of -0.8%, price of 0.2%, and employment of 0.1%.  
This results in a decrease of $16 million in profit for the Washington apple industry, or $101 per 
acre.  Other impacted industries experience relatively small changes to sales, price, and 
employment as well.  Taken as a whole, if the AZM ban had been in place in 2007, the 
Washington economy would have had 0.003% less sales and 0.001% more employment leading 
to an overall $2.3 million decrease in Gross State Product.  These findings suggest that the AZM 
ban, though not pleasant for the apple industry, will not be dire, and will not have large 
consequences for Washington.   
Previous research on the economic consequences of an AZM ban does not use CGE 
analysis and does not consider the larger economic impacts.  Williams and Hinman (1999) use an 
enterprise budget to estimate the profitability of producing Red Delicious apples in Washington 
under conventional practices and when OPs are eliminated from the insect control program. The 
study estimates a 320% decline in the grower’s profit if either all OPs are eliminated or all but 
one OP is eliminated.  The large decline in estimated profits is due to a higher cost of orchard 
maintenance, increased insect damage, and losses in yield and quality.  However, the Williams 
and Hinman study does not consider the possibility that growers will switch to other non-OP 
pesticides, and it does not consider the wider economic impacts. 
As part of the discussion to eliminate AZM in agricultural production, the EPA 
conducted an economic assessment of the AZM ban on apple growers (EPA BEAD 2005).  Their 
analysis gives cost estimates for the elimination of AZM separately for the Eastern and Western 
regions of the United States.  The study estimates the impacts on growers by comparing the net 
revenues (total revenue minus operating cost) of the current practice of using AZM to the  
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estimated net revenues of three alternative pest management scenarios.  For the Western U.S. 
region, the EPA estimates the net revenues of growers currently using AZM will decline between 
$8.7 and $50.1 million, a 4–23% reduction in profit. While these estimates put into perspective 
the potential economic consequences of eliminating AZM, the analysis does not necessarily 
reflect the impacts on Washington growers specifically, and the range of impacts is large.  
Brunner (2006) criticizes these results for not using realistic costs to implement AZM-alternative 
pesticides.  Furthermore, these results do not capture the economic significance of the ban as it 
ripples through the larger Washington economy. 
 
II.   Computable General Equilibrium Modeling and Methodology 
CGE modeling is a general strategy to estimate macroeconomic impacts.  It is widely used to 
study impacts from topics as diverse as implementing or removing agricultural subsidies and 
production incentives (e.g., Doroodian and Boyd 1999; Razack et al. 2009), trade restrictions and 
liberalizations (e.g., Philippidis and Hubbard 2005; Burfischer et al. 2002; Mai 2008), and 
environmental standards (e.g., Rendleman et al. 1995; Cassells and Meister 2001).  Kehoe and 
Kehoe (1994) give a relatively simple introduction to the theory of CGE analysis as well 
testing—and passing—the reliability of this methodology.   
Zilberman et al. (1991) use general equilibrium techniques to examine the ban of certain 
pesticides on selected fruits, vegetables, and field crops in California.
2 The study indicated that 
the availability of effective substitutes is important to mitigate the effects of a ban (along with 
research and development and supply and trade conditions).  Their findings support our choice to 
                                                 
2 Ethyl parathion is an example. All registered uses of products containing ethyl parathion were cancelled on 
October 31, 2003(Federal Register 2005).  
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We model the reactions of the economy in two alternative scenarios.  The 2007 base case or 
benchmark is where AZM is used as the predominant insecticide to control codling moth in 
Washington apple production.  As the benchmark is the primary production practice in 2007, we 
use actual 2007 data without modification.  The second scenario is the counterfactual in which 
there is a complete AZM ban in 2007.   
  The CGE model consists of equations describing the relationships between subsectors in 
the economy, elasticities describing the behavior changes in response to a shock to the economy, 
and a Social Accounting Matrix (SAM). A SAM is data on the actual flows of economic 
transactions in the economy under study for a single year.  We first calibrate the model to find 
the parameters needed for the model data to perfectly replicate the actual 2007 data.  Then we 
apply these calibrated parameters to the counterfactual to estimate what would have happened if 
AZM were banned in 2007.  The results from the CGE model will be the estimated percent 
difference in economic variables such as sales, price, and employment from the actual 2007 
economic data and that estimated by the model in the counterfactual.   
  Our model is a modification of the Washington State CGE developed by Holland, 
Devadoss, and Stodick (n.d.), which is an enhancement of Löfgren et al. (2002).  Given prices, 
endowments, and technology, producers maximize profit and consumers maximize utility.  Labor 
is mobile across activities, but capital is specific and fixed.  Supply is perfectly elastic and 
foreign savings are variable.  We use Walrasian competitive equilibrium, including the  
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government and a foreign sector, as our solution concept.  All markets, except possibly the labor 
market, clear in equilibrium.  Numerically, the model is constructed using GAMS software and 
calibrated with the PATH solver. 
  The first step to constructing the CGE model is to convert data from an input-output table 
to a SAM.  A SAM is similar to an input-output table but contains additional information on the 
interrelations between production accounts and consumption, government, investment, and other 
accounts.  An example of this additional information is the ownership of factors of production.  
The advantage of using a CGE model over an input-output model is the CGE model’s ability to 
incorporate price changes into its estimates on the impact to the economy.  
  Our construction of the SAM from the IMPLAN data is straightforward using the 
IMPLAN software (MIG, Inc. 2004).  Data on the interactions between the 440 sectors of the 
Washington State economy are obtained from the IMPLAN database (see Data Sources in the 
appendix) and aggregated into 23 sectors.  This reduction in sectors is done for computational 
reasons.  We do not aggregate the upstream and downstream sectors of the apple industry in 
order to study them in detail.  Thus our sectors include (but are not limited to) Fruit, Pest 
Management, Nursery, Electricity, Utilities, Wholesale, Frozen, Can Dry, Other Food, and 
Transportation (see figure 1).   
  The second step is to separate the apple industry from the fruit sector.  IMPLAN data 
comes at the sector level, so in order to model the apple industry specifically, we split the fruit 
sector with 71.5% to apples and the remaining to a separate other fruit industry (USDA NASS 
(2009).  Also, we need the production costs for the apple industry.  We use the Washington apple 
enterprise budget from Mon and Holland (2006) for this information (appendix table 4).  We  
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assume the AZM ban affects only the growers using AZM in 2007, so we scale the industry 
production costs to account for the fact that only two-thirds of apple producing acres used AZM.
3   
The SAM gives us a baseline and corresponds to the 2007 benchmark.  We impose a 
change to the model replicating the change to the apply industry from the AZM ban and then 
trace the simulated impact on the apple industry, the industries that supply the apple industry, 
and the effect on households and other industries in that economy.  Figure 1 illustrates the supply 
chain of the apple industry.  We highlight the chemicals or agricultural pesticides in the figure 
since these are the inputs exogenously modified in our alternative IPM scenarios.  
Assumptions 
We look at the economic impact of the AZM ban in apple production in comparison to the next 
best alternative insecticides and management systems.  Based on Brunner et al. (2007), we 
assume that the next best alternative is an IPM program using an assortment of new AZM-
alternative insecticides.  Though not all of the new pesticides expected to replace AZM were 
available in 2007, the counterfactual assumes that these alternatives were available.  We estimate 
what the per acre cost of using these alternative pesticides would have been if they were 
available in 2007 in order to maintain the same volume and quality.  Then we enter the increase 
in cost (as the percent difference from actual 2007 costs) into the model by decreasing the 
technical coefficient of pesticides for apple production.  This forces the apple industry to react to 
a situation where the effectiveness of per unit pesticide is less than before by choosing different 
levels of production inputs such as labor or pesticides, resulting in changes to apple output.  
Because the increase in the per acre pesticide expenditure to maintain previous yield and quality 
is not the same as the technical coefficient (which is independent of price), we make an 
                                                 




assumption on how pesticide expenditure relates to pesticide productivity (apple yield per unit of 
pesticide).   
 
Figure 1. Supply chain of the Washington apple industry. 
Source: Reprinted from Schotzko and Granatstein (2004), page 27, except for our highlighting.    
 
  We decrease the technical coefficient on pesticides in the apple activity by the same 
amount we calculate to be the increase in pesticide expenditures needed to maintain yield and 
quality.  This assumption errs on the high side—in reality the decrease to the technical 
coefficient will be less than the increase in expenditure—because both the price and quantity of 
the AZM-alternative pesticides increases compared to AZM in the expenditure calculation.  But 
the change to the technical coefficient is, by definition, the change in yield from using the same  
 
9
amount of the alternative management scheme.  Thus the change to the technical coefficient 
must be a quantity change only and so can be no greater than the expenditure change  
(%Δ Expenditure = %Δ Price + %Δ Quantity).  We do not have enough information to identify 
this quantity change separately from expenditure.  Therefore we use our expenditure estimate for 
our technical coefficient knowing the resulting economic impact estimate will be an upper 
bound.   
Because our pesticide expenditure estimate is based on the cost needed to maintain the 
yield and quality of the apple crop at the benchmark level, we assume that there will be no 
economic impacts from loss in quality.  All impacts come from extra costs associated with 
increased prices and quantities for the new OP-alternative pesticides and correct spray and 
timing issues that are included in our budget estimates.  Our costs for the counterfactual include 
an additional spray application and its associated use of extra chemicals, labor hours, and tractor 
use.  Though non-AZM IPM programs require precise timing of applications that can take time 
for the grower to learn, our counterfactual assumes that growers have already learned the best 
application methods.   
  We assume that there are no differences in the costs of monitoring between the AZM-
based IPM and the AZM-alternative IPM.  AZM-alternative IPM requires more precise spraying 
and timing of applications than the conventional scheme.  Most growers, however, use a 
pesticide consultant to organize their pesticide use.  In most cases of switching away from AZM, 
the service of the pesticide consultant is provided by the pesticide distributor, without additional 
charge, conditional on the grower using pesticides from the manufacturer (Brunner 2009).  Thus 
we assume any additional costs due to more precise monitoring and application procedures using  
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the new pesticides are either explicitly given in the quoted price of the pesticide or are captured 
in the number of spray applications.   
Finally, it is not apparent now whether the use of new pesticides will result in more or 
less labor costs on net.  The more rigorous application that the new pesticides require to be 
effective increases labor costs.  But workers can return to the crop one day after spraying 
compared to 14 days for AZM.  This enhanced worker flexibility likely decreases labor costs.  
We settle on no change to labor efficiency in the apple industry, though we do a robustness 
check in the appendix.   
Rather than project the accumulated costs of switching from AZM to the next best 
alternative from the phase-out period (2007 to 2012) and onwards, we estimate the economic 
impacts if AZM could not be used in 2007. We assume the next best alternative to be an AZM-
alternative IPM using an assortment of new pesticides that are safer but costlier.  Though other 
OPs such as Lorsban (chlorpyrifos), Dianizon, and Imidan (phosmet) are legal as of this writing, 
increased EPA scrutiny leads us to predict all OP usage will be curtailed in the future. Therefore 
we do not consider switching from AZM to another OP to be a realistic option.
4  We assume that 
the Washington apple growing industry reacts to the AZM ban by choosing the amount of 
alternative pesticide and other inputs to production given the decrease in the technical 
coefficient.  Finally, we assume that no foreign countries prevent the importation of Washington 
apples due to the alternative pesticide despite 30% of Washington orchard owners and managers 
fearing such a ban (Washington State University 2010).  Any substantial international 
restrictions put in place for the AZM-alternative pesticides will increase the economic impacts 
beyond what we estimate.  
                                                 
4 As of this writing, Lorsban is restricted to use before bloom in the spring, when codling moth are not active.  
Diazinon is not effective against codling moth.  Imidan is therefore the only OP-based alternative that could be used 
for codling moth control.    
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  Though AZM is a pesticide used to control codling moth, the ban will affect apple 
growers’ control of other pests, such as the leafroller, to some degree.  Therefore, there will be 
changes to the percent of acres sprayed with other pesticides.  We account for changes to the use 
of other pesticides as a result of the AZM ban.   
  Our economic impact estimate does not include economic changes from a healthier work 
force and healthier communities or changes to income or employment from the end of sales of 
AZM (produced by Bayer CropScience, Gowan Co., and Makhteshim Agan) and their 
replacement by alternatives. Also we do not consider the additional costs facing the American 
consumer from potential increased apple prices. Finally we do not consider any impact from 
either the State government or Federal government-provided education programs to inform apple 
growers about the ban and how to effectively manage it. 
 
Costs of Pest Management 
The insect management program costs are one piece of the total production costs of apples 
obtained from the enterprise budget of Mon and Holland (2006). In the 2007 benchmark, 66% of 
apple producing acres used AZM along with pheromones for mating disruption and the 
pesticides Intrepid and Rimon to make up an IPM program.  There is no one-for-one replacement 
for AZM, so in the 2007 counterfactual, three pesticides—Delegate, Altacor, and Assail—
substitute for AZM.  The use of pheromones and chemicals for other pests like mites, leafrollers, 
and aphids are the same across the two cases, though the acres sprayed change.   
Table 1 gives the projected costs of an insect control program in 2007 for the two 
scenarios. Input cost per acre is the quoted purchaser price of the pesticide times the number of 
sprays times the percent of acres sprayed.  Application cost per acre is the cost of the labor, fuel,  
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and depreciation to spray an acre once (assumed to be $30) times the number of sprays times the 
percent of acres sprayed. Total cost per acre is the sum of the input cost and application cost per 
acre.  Brunner (2009) provides the costs for the pesticides and their use.  
 
Table 1: 2007 Insect Control Program Costs, Benchmark (with AZM) and Counterfactual, $/acre  
 
Compound Trade  Name 
Benchmark
  Counterfactual 
Input Application Total  Input Application Total 
Oil Oil  20.40 25.50 45.90 20.40  25.50 45.90
Miticides Miticides  12.00 6.00 18.00 12.00  6.00 18.00
azinphosmethyl 
AZM-
Guthion 42.07 47.52 89.59 -  - 0.00
phosmet Imidan   3.12 3.12 6.24 -  - 0.00
methoxyfenozide Intrepid  7.78 5.61 13.39 18.30  13.20 31.50
spinosad Success 31.23 16.38 47.61 -  - 0.00
imidacloprid Provado  3.40 - 3.40 0.84  - 0.84
novaluron Rimon  12.17 5.85 18.02 4.06 1.95 6.01
chlorpyrifos  Lorsban    12.29 - 12.29 7.68  - 7.68
thiacloprid  Calypso  1.49 0.99 2.48 1.49  0.99 2.48
Pheromones Pheromones  78.40 21.00 99.40 78.40 21.00 99.40
diazinon Diazinon  2.10 2.97 5.07 2.10  2.97 5.07
AZM alternatives:      
rynaxypyr Altacor  - - - 53.78  30.00 83.78
spinetoram Delegate  - - - 67.12  36.00 103.12
acetampirid Assail  39.75 23.46 63.21 30.50  18.00 48.50
   Total  266.19 158.40 424.59 296.65  155.61 452.26
Sources: USDA NASS (2008); Brunner (2009). 
Notes: See appendix tables 2–3 for more details and sources. Changes from the benchmark to the counterfactual 
appear in bold.  Numbers are rounded to nearest hundredth. Total cost per acre is the sum of input cost per acre 
based on the price of the pesticide times the number of sprays times the percent of acres sprayed and the application 
cost per acre which is the cost of the labor, fuel, and depreciation to spray an acre once (assumed to be $30) times 
the number of sprays times the percent of acres sprayed. 
 
The total cost of the insecticide program is $425 per acre when AZM is used to control 
codling moth compared to $452/acre when AZM alternatives are used.  Thus we estimate a 6.5% 
increase in the cost of pesticides—and therefore a 6.5% decrease in the technical coefficient of  
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pesticides in the apple activity—in the counterfactual.
5  The per acre cost in the counterfactual is 
greater because the non-AZM pesticides are more expensive per acre and an additional spray is 
required to match the protection of AZM (from 1.58 applications of AZM per acre to 2.80 
applications of AZM alternatives per acre).
6  Provado and Lorsban do not have application costs 
because we assume these pesticides are always mixed with other pesticides.  Note that these 
budgets include the cost of controlling other insects.  The cost of codling moth control alone is 
$211/acre (AZM + phosmet + pheromones + half sprays of Intrepid and Rimon) in the 
benchmark and $354/acre (Delegate + Altacor + Assail + pheromones + half sprays of Intrepid 
and Rimon) in the counterfactual. The cost differences between the two scenarios are attributed 
not only to the cost of AZM and AZM alternatives but also to the resulting change in chemicals 
that control other pests.
7   
 
III.  Results and Discussion 
The results for sales, prices, and employment are listed in table 2.  The benchmark is the 2007 
data with AZM.  The counterfactual is the model’s estimates for what would have occurred in 
2007 if AZM had been banned.  The percent change = ((counterfactual – benchmark) / 
benchmark)*100. 
  Apples are the featured industry and so those results are given in the first row of table 2.  
We impacted the apple industry by decreasing the technical coefficient of pesticide in the 
                                                 
5 By comparison, the loss in productivity from organic techniques is about 10% (Brunner 2009). 
6 We cannot calculate the decrease in the technical coefficient from per acre application counts because of the 
interaction of other pesticides in control.   
7 Chlorpyrifos – use of this product decreases due to other chemicals that control both leafrollers and codling moth 
(Altacor, Intrepid and Delegate). Methoxyfenozide – use increases for leafroller control because of the reduced use 
of Lorsban (chlorpyrifos); Spinosad – the product is replaced by Delegate (spinetoram) in the counterfactual; 
Imidacloprid – use decreases because Assail (acetampirid) provides control of aphids, which is the primary use of 
Provado (imidacloprid); and Novaluron – use declines due to concerns with disrupting pest mites.  Thiaclorpid and 
acetamiprid are used for codling moth and aphids control.    
 
14
production of apples by 6.5% reflecting the increase in the total cost per acre of pesticide in that 
industry.  The model estimates that the change in apple sales would have been -0.8% or -$11.6 
million.  The corresponding price change to Washington consumers would have been an increase 
of 0.2% and a decrease in production by 0.8%.  Employment in the apple industry is estimated to 
be 22 workers larger in the counterfactual.  This is because the model is compensating for the 
decrease in pesticide efficiency by substituting more labor.   
  Though the AZM ban does affect the apple industry, the economic impact is relatively 
mild for apple industry sales, prices, and employment.  Our findings are much less severe than 
those estimated by Williams and Hinman (1999) because those authors do not allow apple 
growers to switch to an alternative pesticide when AZM is banned.  Because we do, the model’s 
apple growers can choose to mitigate the damage done from loss in quality, an important 
consideration as shown by Zilberman et al. (1991).  Our industry profit estimate, however, is 
within the lower range of the EPA (EPA BEAD 2005).  We estimate that the aggregate 
Washington apple industry would have had $16 million less profit in 2007 if AZM had been 
banned, about $101 per ace, due to the increase in pesticide expenses and decrease in sales.   
  The rows immediately following apples are the horizontal industries:  other fruit and 
other crops.  Because the AZM ban will affect all crops and not just apples, we decrease the 
technical coefficient of pesticides in the other fruit industry by 0.55%.  Otherwise the model 
responds to the AZM ban by increasing the production of other fruit to offset the decrease in 
apple sales.  This is not a realistic scenario since AZM will not be allowed on other fruit or 
crops. The results show a slight increase in the consumer price of other fruit (0.203%), though 
unlike apples, there is also a slight increase in overall sales (0.038%).  The other crops sector 
shows a slight increase in price, but with a very small increase in sales. 
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Table 2: Results for Sales, Employment, and Domestic Consumer Price 
 SALES   
(VALUE OF ACTIVITY PRODUCED) 
EMPLOYMENT WASHINGTON 
CONSUMER PRICE 
Benchmark Counterfactual Percent  Change  Benchmark  Counterfactual  Percent Change  Percent Change 
(Millions) (Millions)  (%)      (%)  (%) 
Apples 1545.96  1534.36  -0.751  15857  15879  0.139  0.203 
Other Fruit  614.11  614.34  0.038  7811  7822  0.141  0.203 
Other Crops  3599.81  3599.90  0.002  34523  24527  0.010  -0.006 
Upstream Ind.             
Pest Management  100.69  100.35  -0.335  61  60  -0.764  -0.394 
Nursery 401.18  401.19  0.002  3819  3819  0.004 -0.001 
Electric 5916.96  5916.96  -0.004  21851  21850  -0.005  -0.002 
Utilities 1644.18  1644.18  -0.004  2316  2316  -0.008  -0.001 
Downstream Ind.             
Wholesale 25174.77  25174.28  -0.002 136000  136000  -0.002  -0.001 
Frozen 990.43  989.73  -0.071  7277  7272  -0.077  0.015 
Can Dry  2205.53  2204.91  -0.028  3447  3446  -0.055  0.006 
Other Food  12088.83  12087.42  -0.012  28174  28169  -0.016  0.004 
Transportation 16891.14  16890.92  -0.001 111000  111000  -0.001  -0.001 
Other Sectors  476831.34 476829.16  -0.000  3511530  3511529  -0.000  — 
     Total 548004.93  547987.36  -0.003  3882668  3882689 0.001  — 
 
Notes:  Percent Change = ((Counterfactual – Benchmark) / Benchmark) * 100.  Values are rounded.  Sales = quantity of activity x price of activity and are the 
revenue received by the producer.  Employment is the quantity demanded of labor by activity.  Washington consumer price is the market demand price for the 




  The next group is the upstream industries.  Besides apples and other fruit, pest 
management is, not surprisingly, the sector most affected by the AZM ban.  The increase in the 
cost of pesticides results in a decrease in total sales.  Here too, the economic impact of the ban is 
relatively mild.  Both the electric and utility sectors decrease slightly in sales because of the 
decrease in apple production.  Since the change to apples is small, the change to these upstream 
industries is small also. 
  The downstream industries are also not much affected by the AZM ban.  The downstream 
industry most impacted by the AZM ban is the frozen sector.  But even here, sales are estimated 
to have been only $704,000 less in the counterfactual and resulting in six less employees.  The 
remaining sectors were aggregated because of their weak economic connections with the apple 
industry.  And the ban has negligible impact on them. 
  The overall Washington economy is not strongly affected by the AZM ban.  This is 
because though the apple industry is large in the state economy, the small impact in the apple 
industry creates even smaller ripples to the upstream and downstream industries.  We estimate 
that Washington would have had 21 more workers in employment if the AZM ban had been in 
effect in 2007 and overall state sales would have been 0.003% smaller.  The fact that there are 
not large impacts to the overall economy is consistent with theoretical results on tax increases to 
specific intermediate inputs and sector-specific factor taxes (Sue Wang n.d.).  We estimate the 
change to indirect taxes and state government revenue to be negligible.   
Other estimates from our simulation of the AZM ban include that household income does 
not change appreciably and there is no macroeconomic change to wages.  But we estimate a 
change in household consumption of apples by -0.122%.  This is due to the slight, but 
nonetheless positive change in the price of apples.  This reduction in apple consumption means  
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there could be a very minor negative health consequence for consumers offsetting the health 
benefits to orchard workers and their families.  This conjecture is, however outside of our formal 
model.      
 
IV.  Conclusion 
Because of the size of the apple industry in Washington’s economy, the EPA’s ban on AZM 
could have resulted in large economic impacts to the apple industry, causing ripples through the 
upstream and downstream industries, and the overall economy.  We use realistic prices for the 
likely AZM alternative IPM system to estimate the percent increase in expenditure for spraying 
an acre of apple orchard if the AZM ban had been in effect in Washington in 2007.  We enter 
this cost estimate into a CGE model of the Washington economy by decreasing the technical 
coefficient of pesticides in the apple activity by 6.5%.  Then we simulate the Washington 
economy in 2007 with the ban in effect.  We estimate that though the apple industry would have 
had multimillion-dollar decreases in sales and profit, the direct impact of the ban is not large 
relative to the more than $1.5 billion size of the industry.  Because the direct impact is small, the 
economic ripples through the general economy are also small.  We estimate a negligible change 
to the sales and employment of Washington due to the AZM ban.   
  We use CGE methodology to assess the economic impacts of the AZM ban because we 
are interested in price changes and the inter-sector spillovers.  There are, however, some 
limitations from this approach.  First, we cannot assess the economic impact on any particular 
apple grower, demographic of grower, or geographic region of the state, only the industry 
overall.  Second, because we use a CGE model, we cannot allow growers to quit production and 
use their land for other purposes as VanSickle and NaLampang (2002) do for the phase out of  
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methylbromide.  Thus we do not allow for the AZM ban to cause a shift in apple production 
away from Washington State.  Because the ban is nationwide, we do not consider this a serious 
limitation.  Third, we assume that the new AZM alternative IPM systems can be thought of as 
maintaining apple crop volume and quality at increased cost and decreased efficiency.  Therefore 
we do not consider any economic impacts from a reduction in quality or yield beyond those 
embedded in our cost estimate.  Fourth, we do not model the AZM ban in other U.S. apple 
producing states.  If we were to do this, the impact on Washington would be smaller than we 
estimated since doing so would increase the price of apples from the rest of the United States 
(but not the rest of the world) and thereby decreasing consumers desire to substitute Washington 
apples for these other apples.  Fifth, we are not able to estimate the long-term health 
consequences from workers being exposed to fewer OPs and Washington consumers eating 
fewer apples.  Finally, we estimate the economic impact from the AZM ban for one year only, 
2007.  Therefore the economic impact to the apple industry and the Washington economy will be 
larger if considered over a period of years.   
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Appendix 
Historical AZM Usage in Washington 





















1991 90  2.8  0.88 2.44 345.0  157
1993 81  3.3  0.91 3.02 357.9  147
1995 94  3.3  0.99 3.30 474.4  153
1997 91  2.9  0.95 2.77 390.2  155
1999 78  2.3  0.96 2.31 309.3  172
2001 73  2.0  0.94 1.96 241.4  168
2003 78  2.2  1.01 2.29 289.2  162
2005 72  1.8  0.97 1.75 196.4  155
2007 66  2.4  0.96 2.27 236.3  158
Source:  Agricultural Chemical Usage—Fruits, USDA NASS (1992–2008).  For 2007 data see p. 28 and 50 of the 
2008 edition. 
Notes:  The area applied is the percent of crop acres receiving one or more applications of AZM.  Application rates 
refer to the average number of pounds of AZM applied to an acre of land.  Number of applications is the average 
number of times a treated acre received AZM. Rate per application is the average number of pounds applied per 
acre in one application. Rate per crop year is the average number of pounds applied per acre counting multiple 
applications.  
 
Data Sources  
  Washington fruit and apple data.  We use USDA NASS (2009) Agri-Facts for 
Washington (http://www.nass.usda.gov/Statistics_by_State/Washington/Publications/Agri-
facts/agri1jul.pdf) to calculate the ratio of the value of apple production to the total value of fruit 
production.  We then apply this ratio to the value of production in the Washington fruit industry 
given by 2007 IMPLAN data (see next subsection).  We use USDA NASS (2008) Agricultural 
Chemical Usage 2007 Field Crops Summary 
(http://usda.mannlib.cornell.edu/usda/nass/AgriChemUsFruits//2000s/2008/AgriChemUsFruits-
05-21-2008.pdf) for apple bearing acres and pesticide and AZM use in Washington.   
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 Input-Output  data.  We use a 2007 IMPLAN (IMpact analysis for PLANning) input-
output table for the Washington State economy.  IMPLAN data files are sold by the Minnesota 
IMPLAN Group, Inc (MIG). MIG compiles input-output data from a variety of sources, but 
mainly the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Census Bureau, 
Department of Agriculture and Geological Survey. See 
http://implan.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=86&Itemid=57. 
 Insect  control  costs. The cost estimates of an insect control program with and without 
AZM are obtained from Brunner (2009) and shown in appendix tables 2–3.  Costs include the 
prices of some new products registered and sold in 2008.  The cost of the labor, fuel, and 
equipment depreciation associated with a one acre-application is thought to be $30 (though we 
increase this in a robustness check below).  Other management costs such as pruning, 
fertilization, weed and disease control, and harvest are treated in the model as a constant between 
the benchmark and counterfactual. 
 
Appendix table 2. Cost of insecticide, 2008 prices. 
Chemical $/unit  units/acre  $/acre 
azinphosmethyl 0.83  32.0 26.56
Intrepid 2.60  16.0 41.60
Success 5.72  10.0 57.20
Provado 1.6F  2.10  4.0 8.40
Rimon   1.56  40.0 62.40
Pheromone 0.28  400.0 112.00
Lorsban 4E  0.30  64.0 19.20
Dianizon 5.30  4.0 21.20
Altacor 11.95  4.5 53.78
Delegate 7.99  7.0 55.93
Assail 14.95  3.4 50.83
Calypso 7.50  6.0 45.00
Imidan 6.00  5.0 30.00




Appendix table 3a.  Insect Control Program Costs Using AZM for Codling Moth Control  















Oil Oil  85 1.0 0.85 20.40  25.50 45.90
miticides Miticides  20 1.0 0.20 12.00  6.00 18.00
azinphosmethyl 
AZM-
Guthion 66 2.4 1.58 42.07  47.52 89.59
acetamiprid Assail  46 1.7 0.78 39.75 23.46 63.21
thiacloprid Calypso  3 1.1 0.03 1.49  0.99 2.48
phosmet Imidan    8 1.3 0.10 3.12  3.12 6.24
methoxyfenozide Intrepid  17 1.1 0.19 7.78  5.61 13.39
spinosad Success  39 1.4 0.55 31.23  16.38 47.61
imidacloprid Provado  27 1.5 0.41 3.40  - 3.40
novaluron Rimon  15 1.3 0.20 12.17 5.85 18.02
pheromones Pheromones  70 1.0 0.70 78.40  21.00 99.40
chlorpyrifos Lorsban  64 1.0 0.64 12.29  12.29
diazinon Diazinon  9 1.1 0.10 2.10  2.97 5.07
        Total 6.33 266.19  158.40 424.59
 
Appendix table 3b.  Insect Control Program Costs Using AZM alternatives for Codling Moth 
Control  















HMO Oil  85 1.0 0.85 20.40  25.50 45.90
miticides Miticides  20 1.0 0.20 12.00  6.00 18.00
rynaxypyr Altacor  40 2.5 1.00 53.78  30.00 83.78
spinetoram Delegate  40 3.0 1.20 67.12 36.00 103.12
acetamiprid Assail  30 2.0 0.60 30.50  18.00 48.50
thiacloprid Calypso  3 1.1 0.03 1.49  0.99 2.48
methoxyfenozide Intrepid  40 1.1 0.44 18.30  13.20 31.50
imidacloprid Provado  10 1.0 0.10 0.84  - 0.84
novaluron Rimon  5 1.3 0.07 4.06 1.95 6.01
pheromones pheromones  70 1.0 0.70 78.40  21.00 99.40
chlorpyrifos Lorsban    40 1.0 0.40 7.68  - 7.68
diazinon Diazinon  9 1.1 0.10 2.10  2.97 5.07
         Total 5.69 296.65  155.61 452.26
Sources: Data on percent area treated of oil, miticides and methoxyfenozide are from Brunner (2009); the rest are 
from the 2007 Agricultural Chemical Usage—Fruit Report (USDA NASS 2008).   
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Notes: Input cost = number of acre applications times the cost of input/insecticide per acre. See appendix table 2 for 
the price of insecticides. Application cost = $30 x acre application. Application cost specific to the pesticide is not 
given because it is assumed that it is mixed in the same tank with another product.   
 
  Washington Apple Enterprise Budget. 
Appendix table 4. Apple Production Function in Input-Output Accounting Framework. 
Sector Names  Apple Industry Output 
($/acre) 
Apple Industry Output, 
aggregated ($)
a 
Inputs   
Tape & twine  50.00 10,107,250.00 
Fertilizer 48.91 9,886,911.95 
Chemicals 670.40 135,508,008.00 
Beehives 35.00 7,075,075.00 
Pheromone dispensers  110.00 22,235,950.00 
Custom hauling  187.50 37,902,187.50 
Irrig/Electric charge  168.75 34,111,968.75 
Equipment repair  227.74 46,036,502.30 
Equipment fuel/lube  147.37 29,790,108.65 
Total inputs  1,645.67 332,663,962.15 
   
Value Added   
Employee compensation  1,403.59 283,728,700.55 
Proprietary income
b 166.52 33,661,185.40 
Other property income
c 666.08 134,664,741.60 
Indirect business taxes 133.45 26,976,250.25 
Total Value Added
d 2,369.64 479,010,877.80 
   
Total Industry Outlay
e 4,015.31 811,674,839.95 
Source: Reprinted from Mon and Holland (2006), page 137. 
Notes: a – Assumed total apple acreage = 202,145; b – Incomes received by self-employed entrepreneurs. c – Earned 
by corporations rather than sole proprietors; d – Sum of employee compensation, other property income, proprietary 
income, and indirect business taxes; e – Sum of individual inter-industry input purchases and value added. 
 
Robustness of Results 
Because some of our assumptions have a degree of conjecture, we consider numerous ad hoc 
changes to the model to determine the extent to which these assumptions affect the results.   
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  Changes to the cost of applying one spray on one acre.  We assume that the cost of the 
labor, fuel, and depreciation to spray an acre once is $30 for both the benchmark and the 
counterfactual.  This is based on anecdote.  Therefore we check the difference in total pesticide 
cost in the two scenarios when this increases by 10% (to $33), 25% (to $37.50), and 50% (to 
$45).  Note that this cost, whatever its value, is assumed to be the same in both the benchmark 
and counterfactual.  By increasing this labor, fuel, and depreciation cost, the percent increase in 
the total cost of using AZM to AZM alternative decreases.  Because the increase in total cost 
decreases, the estimates in the main text become even smaller and thus we do not separately 
report them.    
Appendix table 5. Robustness Check on the Cost of Labor, Fuel, and Depreciation to Spray One 
Acre Once 
Cost of labor & fuel, to 
spray one acre once 
($) 







30.00 424.59 452.26 6.52 
33.00 440.43 467.82 6.22 
37.50 464.19 491.17 5.81 
45.00 503.79 530.07 5.22 
 
  Changes to the production share of labor.  There is currently no consensus about how 
switching from AZM to non-AZM alternatives will affect labor productivity.  It is possible that 
labor efficiency in the apple industry decreases because of the greater need for monitoring and 
precisely timed applications of the AZM alternatives.  But this is offset by the possibility that 
workers can return to the orchard much quicker after spraying the AZM alternatives compared to 
AZM.  The main results assumed that these conflicting forces result in no change to labor 
efficiency.    
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  We experiment by increasing the production function share parameter of labor in the 
apple activity.  This means the apple industry needs to use more labor than before.  We find the 
economic impact estimates for both the apple industry and the overall economy are very 
sensitive to this parameter.  Changing this labor production share parameter by values smaller 
than 1% results in large consequences.  We conclude that any large economic consequences from 
the AZM ban will be due to the as yet unknown changes to labor in the apple industry and not to 
the expenditure changes from alternative pesticides.  The details of this experimentation may be 
found in the online appendix at http://www.ses.wsu.edu/People/faculty/Cassey/Webpage/.   
    
Selected Equations and Code from the Model 
Our model is a modification of the Washington State CGE developed by Holland, Devadoss, and 
Stodick (n.d.), which is an enhancement of Löfgren et al. (2002).  The GAMS code is available 
as part of the online appendix available from  
http://www.ses.wsu.edu/People/faculty/Cassey/Webpage/.  Below we include the equations from 
the model directly affected by our counterfactual change to the technical coefficient of the 
pesticide commodity for the apple activity.  Note that the model is a system of simultaneous 
equations and therefore the equations below do not relate to each other sequentially.  
  For the counterfactual, we decrease the technical coefficient for the pesticide commodity 
in apple activity.  The technical coefficient is the parameter ica(C,A) and is the quantity of 
commodity C as intermediate input per unit of activity A.  It is defined by 
ica(c,A)  QINTO(C,A) QAO(A) where QINTO(C,A) is the initial quantity of intermediate use 
of commodity C by activity A and QAO(A) is the initial activity level.  It is a term in the 
production shift parameter of activity A, ad(A).  We code  
  ica("PESTMAN-C","APPLE-A")= .935*ica("PESTMAN-C","APPLE-A");  
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 ica("PESTMAN-C","FRUIT-A")=  .9945*ica("PESTMAN-C","FRUIT-A"); 
into GAMS.   
  The technical coefficient enters the model as a term in the production shift parameter of 
the apple activity.  Given QFO(F,A), the initial quantity demanded of factor F by activity A, the 
indirect business tax rate, tb(A), and the Constant Elasticity of Substitution production function 
share parameter, δ(F,A), and exponent, ρ(A),     
ad(A) 








The technical coefficient is also a term in the intermediate input demand equation for commodity 
C in the production of activity A,QINT(C,A) ica(C,A)*QA(A), where QA(A) is the activity 
level of A and is calculated by 
QA(A) 
ad(A)






(A).   
Thus, changing the technical coefficient parameter directly impacts the intermediate input 
demand equation, which in turn changes the quantity supplied to domestic commodity demands 
(including intermediate producers), thus changing QF(F,A), the quantity demanded of factor F 
by activity A, and finally changing the quantity of activity A.      
  The activity price is PA(A)  PX(C)*(A,C)
C   where PX(C) is the producer (supply) 
price (of commodity C and θ(A,C) is the yield of output C per unit of activity A.  For table 2, we 
calculate Sales(A)  PA(A)*QA(A). 
 